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Mr Chairman, Distinguished Representatives:  The University of London∗ appreciates 
the opportunity once again to participate in the NGO Statements offered to the 
Meeting of States Parties. We attach great importance to the BWC and our message 
is one of encouragement. We encourage you to bring this Intersessional Process to a 
productive conclusion and so set the scene for success at the Eighth Review 
Conference. This will require the formulation of clear consensus recommendations 
and widely acceptable text, so that all the necessary materials are ready for the 
Conference to take decisions: decisions which will reinforce the Convention with the 
strengthening it needs for its effective operation, including an Implementation 
Support Unit resourced so as to match the tasks entrusted to its staff, a dedicated 
forum for the collective discussion of annual CBM returns, and updated mandates for 
this annual Meeting and other elements of a restructured Intersessional Process.  
We encourage you to make every effort to achieve such outcomes. 
  
Our statement first addresses Standing Agenda Item II:  Review of Developments 
in Science and Technology 
  
We have long taken a particular interest in the impact of developments in science 
and technology (S&T) on the health of the BWC and how you as the States Parties 
review this, latterly as a Standing Agenda Item. While this guaranteed frequency is 
an improvement on what happened before 2011, the overall experience has been 
disappointingly uneven. For the Convention to flourish there has to be a 
strengthening of its S&T review procedure. 
  
S&T would benefit from upgrading into a dedicated forum such as an Open Ended 
Working Group with its Chair and Vice-Chairs appointed for several years at a time 
and a Scientific Secretary added to the establishment of the ISU to give the Group 
continuous professional support. Moreover, there would be advantage in having the 
Group meet separately from the Meeting of Experts in a restructured Intersessional 
Process and feed its recommendations to the States Parties directly. It should have a 
mandate as an organ of the Convention carrying forward the S&T review function 
envisaged from the start in Article XII  - but henceforth on a more systematic basis. 
  
Upgrading S&T to a dedicated Open Ended Working Group finds its justification in 
the wide extent of developments affecting the health of the BWC that need to be kept 
under review, across the range of the life sciences and beyond. Some appear to 
threaten the Convention while others may be of benefit. Certain gene editing 
technologies and ‘gain-of-function’ experiments with potential pandemic pathogens 
appear threatening; while advances in microbial forensics appear beneficial. These 
are just some examples. There are many more.  S&T developments must be 
assessed collectively, and an Open Ended Working Group would be inclusive, open 
to all States Parties and (we would hope) to academies of science and other relevant 
organisations which could help in making these collective judgments. 
  
One important way in which States Parties can demonstrate their commitment to the 
BWC is through applying the precautionary principle to dual-use research of concern 
(DURC) and ensuring that such research is prudently constrained. DURC is not 
banned by the Convention but if not sufficiently regulated it can damage the 
BWC. Experiments deemed to carry excessive risks, broadly understood, should not 
be allowed at all. All DURC should be subject to comprehensive risk assessment and 
only allowed under rigorous justification - and  then always under stringent control.  
  
Within Standing Agenda Item III: Strengthening National Implementation, we 
attach particular importance to identifying those improvements in implementation, 
and transparency in reporting it, which will provide the most reassurance that the 
Convention is being observed. We welcome the initiative taken by the cross-regional 
sponsors of the Working Paper on Providing Reassurance in Implementation and 
hope they will pursue this initiative with ever-widening support, so that there can 
develop a full analytical and conceptual discussion of what is involved. To put it 
simply, States Parties need to find the best ways in which they can reassure one 
another, as treaty partners, and reassure all of us, that everything they are doing and 
everything they allow others to do is in line with the letter and the spirit of their BWC 
obligations. The prevention criterion in Article IV is relevant here: it is not enough to 
prohibit BW activities, they must be prevented.  
 
The credibility of the Convention will suffer if States Parties do not give this task of 
reassurance the high priority it requires. It is basic to the treaty relationship. We hope 
one outcome of this Meeting of States Parties will be a clear recommendation to the 
Eighth Review Conference that, whatever form a restructured Intersessional Process 
may take, it must include this ‘reassurance agenda’.  
  
In conclusion, Mr Chairman, we recall the 40th anniversary of the BWC’s entry into 
force which we marked in March, and the 90th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol’s 
signature which followed in June. These were occasions for all of us to commit 
ourselves afresh to nurturing these two treaties and keeping them relevant through 
changing times. We encourage everyone to join our extended discussion about the 
Geneva Protocol, at the lunchtime side event sponsored by UNIDIR and France. 
 
Finally, we would like to highlight our new textbook coming out in early 2016 on 
biological disarmament and nonproliferation. The edited collection, by nearly 40 
leading academics and experts, introduces readers to the politics, people, science 
and historical roots of contemporary biological threats. 
 
We wish your Meeting of States Parties success in reaching consensus and in your 
important task of steering the BWC collectively into a constructive path of evolution. 
We thank you for your attention to our statement. 
  
Thank you, Mr Chairman. 
 
Mr Nicholas Sims 
Emeritus Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics & Political Science 
 
Dr Filippa Lentzos  
Senior Research Fellow, Department of Social Science, Health & Medicine, King’s College London 
 
Prof Brian Balmer  
Professor in Science Policy Studies, Department of Science & Technology Studies, University College 
London 
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